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Case No. 20140716-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

Plain tiff!Appellee,
V.

JOHN L. LEGG,
Defend.ant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from an order revoking probation on convictions
for aggravated assault and possession of a dangerous weapon by a
resh·icted person, both third degree felonies. This Court has jurisdiction
under Utah Code Aim.§ 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2012).

INTRODUCTION
This is Defendant's second appeal from the district court's order
revoking his probation. Defendant's appeal is moot because his sentence
has expired and he has been released fron1 prison.
In any event, revoking probation was well within the distrkt court's
discretion.

The dish·ict court first revoked Defendant's probation after

finding he had three probation violations:

(1) failing to cooperate and

comply with AP&P; (2) possessing cocaine; and (3) failing to establish a
residence. Defendant appealed, arguing that the dish·ict court plainly erred
for revoking his probation upon allegedly insufficient evidence of
willfulness.
On appeal, this Court found the evidence sufficient to support the
district court's finding that Defendant willfully failed to cooperate with
AP&P. State v. Legg (Legg I), 2014 UT App 80, 324 P.3d 656. But the Court
held that the district court had not adequately explained the evidence upon
which it relied in finding the other two willful violations. Although this
Court recognized that" a single violation is sufficient to support a probation
revocation," it remanded because it could not tell whether the district court
would have exercised its discretion to revoke based on the single violation.
On ren1and, the State withdrew the controlled-substance and failureto-establish-a-residence allegations.

The dish·ict court confirmed that it

would have revoked Defendant's probation on the failure-to-cooperate-

vvith-AP&P violation alone: there is "no question that if there had been any
finding of violation c,f probation that it vvould have been revoked."
On his second appeal, Defendant argues that the district court acted
improperly because this Court had 111.ade a "clear expression of concern that
the single violation was not enough to revoke [his] probation."
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Should this Court dismiss Defendant's appeal as moot, where

his sentence has expired and he has been unconditionally released from
prison?

Standard of Review. No standard of review applies.
2.

Alternatively, did the district court plainly violate this Court's

mandate by revoking Defendant's probation for a single probation
violation?

Standard of Review.

Whether a district court complied with an

appellate court's mandate is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. See

McLaughlin v. Schenk, 2013 UT 20, ~19, 299 P.3d 1139. A district court's
probation decision will be reversed only for an abuse of "its considerable
discretion.'' State v. Vazquez, 2014 UT App 159, if 7, 330 P.3d 760.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
No constitutional provisions, statutes or rules are directly relevant to
the issues on appeal.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1
The offenses. Defendant was charged with nine offenses in three

See R0677 at 1-2; R1007 at 1-3; R3013 at 1.

cases.

In December 2009,

Defendant knocked his girlfriend to the floor, h·ied to sh·angle her, andwhen she tried to call police-repeatedly hit her head against the floor.
R0677 at 2-3. That conduct gave rise to the first case.
[~',
'1!{;I

A 1nonth later, Defendant again knocked his girlfriend to the floor

and this time st01nped on her chest. R1007 at 3. His girlfriend called police.

Id. Officers found Defendant hiding in a nearby garage and saw a knife. Id.
at 4. Defendant admitted the knife was his. Id. Charges in the second case
were based on that conduct.

G

In a third case, Defendant n1ailed his girlfriend a letter in violation of
the conditions of a protective order. See R1007 at 268 (referencing -3013).

Trial and judgment.

As part of a global resolution of the cases,

Defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated assault in -0677 and weapon
possession by a resh·icted person in -1007. R.0677 at 246-54; R1007 at 224-32.

1

This appeal arises from the resolution of three cases: dislTict court
nmnbers 101900677, 101901007, and 101903013.
This 1ne1norandu1n
references the cases in text by the hyphenated abbreviations -0677, -1007,
and -3013. For citations, it references the cases by R0677, R1007, and R3013.

-4-

The court dismissed the remaining charges in those cases and all charges in
-0313. See id.; see also R3013 at 70.
The court held a consolidated sentencing hearing and gave Defendant
two concurrent indetern1inate prison terms of up to five years on his
convictions. R0677 at 246-47; R1007 at 224-25. The judge suspended the
prison terms, placed Defendant on 24 months' probation, and imposed
concurrent 180-day jail terms as a condition of probation. Id.

Probation violation. Defendant was released from jail on January 5,
2012. R0677 at 270-03; R1007 at 242-245. Eight days later, Adult Probation
and Parole (AP&P) filed a violation report in both cases. See id. Defendant's
probation officer, Jeremy Jeppson, filed an affidavit in support of an order
to show cause. See R0677 at 274-75; R1007 at 246-47. The officer alleged that
Defendant had violated the terms of hjs probation by possessing cocaine,
using methamphetainine, and not being cooperative and truthful with
AP&P. See id. Defendant denied the allegations. R0677 at 285; R1007 at 256.
On 24 April 2012, Officer Jeppson filed an amended violation report
and an affidavit in support of an order to show cause. R0677 at 292-302;
R.1007 at 265-71. He alleged five violations:

,..;;;

1.

Possessing a conh·olled substance (cocaine);

2.

Using ainphetan1ines;

-5-

3.

Not being cooperative, compliant, and truthful in his dealings
with AP&P;

4.

Not establishing a residence of record or having changed his
residence without approval from AP&P.

5.

Knowingly associating with a known criminal.

R0677 at 302; R1007 at 271. Defendant denied the allegations. R0677 at 305;
R1007 at 278.

Probation revocation. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district
court found that the State had proved allegations 1, 3, and 4 by a
preponderance of the evidence, but not allegations 2 and 5. R0677 at 307-08;
R1007 at 279-80; R301:76, 88-91, 94. 2 The dish·ict court concluded that, based

on his violent history, Defendant was likely ineligible for residential
rehabilitation and that the jail did not offer programs that would help hiln.
R301:127-29.

The court revoked Defendant's probation and executed his

original prison terms. R301:127-28.

First appeal and re1nando

Defendant appealed, and this Court

affinned the district court's finding that Defendant willfully violated his
probation by not being cooperative, c01npliant, and truthful in his dealings
2

R301 is the transcript of the evidentiary hearing held IVIay 2, 2012. It
is part of the record in both -0677 and -1007.
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with AP&P (allegation 3). Legg I, 2014 UT App 80, ,I,I20-21. But the Court
held that the district court had not adequately identified the evidence
supporting its findings that Defendant willfully violated by possessing
drugs or by failing to establish a residence (allegations 1 and 4). Id. iiil19,
23, 25. The Court recognized "that a single violation of probation is legally
sufficient to support a probation revocation." Id. ,11 (citing State v. Jameson,
800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990)).

But the Court was "not confident that,

standing on its own, the single violation" it affirmed on appeal "would have
resulted" in revoking probation. Id. 25.

So the Court remanded for the

district court to identify the evidence that supported allegations 1 and 4 and
to "reassess whether, under all the circumstances," Defendant's "probation
should be revoked." Id.

Proceedings on remand. On ren1and, the State withdrew allegations

1 and 4 and proceeded solely on allegation 3, the willful violation affirmed
on appeal. See R377:9; see also Legg 1, 2014 UT App 80,

if 25. The parties

agreed to forgo an evidentiary hearing and to proceed to oral argum.ent. See

R,.,J_7..-:;•q_1
"-

l

•~

n

_.__,,.

Tl1t1c:::L,.Jf thP rinlu
.;.,a,

...

\...J.I.'-,,

""--JLl..l.)'

n11oc:f·;1"l,
1.r.r.1·
t-ho
'-J\..A·"'----41.Jt..._ \..,../.)..
_,._,_.I.; •
.__1_,,._ '4-ict1·-ic~t
._t...l~•j . .l

co11rt
'-...-.

'\"f,.7;::ls
f\· L-111.

11

-\;.,rl,c-t-l,o·r
\.'
l......__\...1.l~_J__/

under all the circun1stances,'' it would still revoke Defendant's probation
based on the single willful probatim'l violation. Legg 1, 2014 UT App 80,
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,r2s.

At the remand hearing, defense counsel informed the district court
that Defendant had six months left on his original sentence, and that he
would not be paroled in this case, given that he had "been to prison before
and revoked before." R377:13. Counsel acknowledged that Defendant had
"a long history in the system," but argued he was nevertheless an
appropriate candidate for probation. Id.; see R377:14 ("He is not a problem
out at the prison and he has aged .... He's gonna have a difficult time but
he doesn't feel like he's gonna be using drugs. He feels strong and I do see
he's aged through a lot of these difficult times.").
The prosecutor argued that Defendant's pnson sentence should
executed for essentially three reasons:

(1) Defendant had an extensive

crin1inal history; (2) the original sentencing rec01n1nendation was for prison;
and (3) a single violation was a sufficient basis for reinstating the prison
sentence.

See R377:15.

Defendant also addressed the district court and

acknowledged his long crhninal history, which went back to about 1987.
R377:16.

Defendant also acknowledged that he had previously failed to

successfully cmnplete probation. R377:17. Before ruling, the district court
also con11nented on Defendant's history: "'I have dealt with (Defendant] on
n1y calendar for some tiJne." R377:19.

-8-

The district court then ruled that based on the single violation for not
cooperating with AP&P, it would have revoked and would still revoke
Defendant's probation even absent any other violation:

"There is no

question that had I found a violation, looking at his history, looking at the
recommendation, looking at the opportunity for probation that he had
received, I would have iinposed the original sentence."

R377:23.

,.,My

finding is that based on what information the court had at the time that
there was a finding [of] a violation of probation [and] that it was properly a
basis for revoking probation, looking at the entire history of both cases."
R377:24-25.
The court 1nade clear that it would reach the same result reassessing
the question on re1nand: "[T]he only question [that] re1nains is, was the
revocation of probation sufficient on that one single violation? And I have
no question that that would have been my ruling, and that I find that those

circumstances still support it." R377:24 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, district court confirrn.ed ils revocation of Defendant's
probation and execution of his suspended sentences. R377:24--25; R0677:368-69.

Defendant again appealed. See R.0677:360.
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·During the pendency of the appeal, Defendant con1pleted his prison
sentence and was unconditionally released from custody.

See Utah

Department of Corrections letter confirming that Defendant was discharged
from prison on July 15, 2015 (attached in Addendum B). 3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should dismiss the appeal because it is moot. An appeal is
moot if during the pendency of the appeal circu1nstances change so that the
controversy is eliminated, thereby rendering the relief requested impossible
or of no legal effect. Defendant challenges the revocation of his probation.
But Defendant has already served his prison sentence, and he has been
discharged frmn custody. Thus, his probation cannot be reinstated.
Alternatively, Defendant's argu1nent fails on the 1nerits. Defendant
argues that the district court violated this Court's mandate when it
reaffirn1ed his probation revocation. Because Defendant did not make this
argument below, it is unpreserved and he must show plain error.

3

But

Although not included in the record on appeal, this Court n,ay take
judicial notice of the DepartJ.11ent of Corrections discharge letter. See Utah
R. Ev.id. 201 (court 111a y judicially notice fact that is not subject to dj.spute
because it can be accurately and readily determined frorn sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned); see also State ex rel. F.M., 2002
UT App 340, if3, n.2, 57 P.3d 1130 ("Courts 1nay take judicial notice of the
records and prior proceedings in the same case.")
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Defendant cannot show that the district court plainly erred when, in
accordance with this Court's mandate, it determined that it would have
revoked Defendant's probation on the basis of the single probation violation
affirmed by this Court. Nor can Defendant show that the decision was an
abuse of discretion.

ARGUMENT

I.
THIS COURT SHOULD DISMISS THIS APPEAL AS MOOT
Defendant argues that the trial court unjustly revoked his probation,
both when it originally revoked and ·when it reaffirmed its revocation
decision on remand. He asks this Court to again reverse the district court's
decision and remand for it to again detennine whether, under all the
circu1nstances, Defendant's probation should have been revoked.
But Defendant's sentence has now expired, and he has been released

frmn prison.

This Court, therefore, cannot give him any relief, and his

appeal is 1noot.
A.

An appeal is moot when the requested relief cannot affect the
rights of the appellant.

The mootness doctrine. /-\n issue is rnoot when the requested. relief
cam1ot affect the rights of the appellant.

State v. Sims, 881 P.2d 840, 841

(Utah 1994); see Utah Transit Auth. v. Local 382 of Amalgamated Transit Union
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(Local 382), 2012 UT 75, ifl9, 289 P.3d 582. "The defining feature of a moot
conh·oversy is the lack of capacity for the court to order a remedy that will
have a meaningful impact on the practical positions of the parties." Local
382, 2012 UT 75, ,I14. An issue becomes moot while an appeal is pending if

"circumstances change so that the controversy is eliminated, thereby
rendering the relief requested impossible or of no legal effect."

Black, 2015 UT 54, _

Utah Adv. Rep. _

State v.

(quoting Local 382, 2012 UT 75,

114) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Peterson, 2012 UT
App 363, if 4, 293 P.3d 1103; accord In re Adoption of L.O., 2012 UT 23, ,IS, 282
P.3d 977; State v. Hooker, 2013 UT App 91, if 2, 300 P.3d 1292. See also Local
382, 2012 UT 75, ,I15 n.1 (citing Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653-54 (1895), for

proposition that "an appeal should be dismissed as moot where, by virtue
of an ✓ intervening event' the appellate court cannot grant ... any effectual
f

relief whatever' in favor of the appellant").
When an issue is 1noot, both judicial policy and the Utah Constitution
'" dictate[]'" that the court not issue an advisory opinion. Featherson v. Utah

Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 2013 UT App 17,

il3

1

295 P.3d 715 (per curian1)

(citing Sims, 881 P.2d at 841); Local 382, 2012 UT 75,
appeal

11

,r,n.6, 19, 20.

A

lYLOOt

'1nust be disrn.issed ... unless it can be shown to fit within a

recognized exception to the 1nootness principle."' Hooker, 2013 UT App 91,
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12

(citation omitted). That is because the court has "no power to decide

absh"act questions or to render declaratory judgments, in the absence of an
actual conh·oversy directly involving rights." Local 382, 2012 UT 75, if 19.

Exceptions to mootness.

Utah law recognizes two co1nmon

exceptions to the mootness rule. The first is for technically moot cases that
present issues of public interest likely to recur and capable of evading
review.

The Utah Supreme Court discussed that exception in Ellis v.

Swensen, a case dealing with ballet booklets. 2000 UT 101, 16 P.3d 1233.
That exception applies "when a case presents an issue that affects the public
interest, is likely to recur, and because of the brief time that any one litigant
is affected, is capable of evading review." Id. if26; see also Local 382, 2012 UT
75, ,I,I30-33. The court explained that the issues of public interest which it
II

has addressed under this exception are generally class actions, questions of
constitutional interpretation, issues as to the validity or consh·uction of a
statute, or the propriety of administrative rulings." Ellis, 2000 UT 101, 4TI27
(quoting McRae v. Jackson, 526 P.2d 1190, 1191 (Utah 1974) (internal

quotation marks 0111.itted) (ernphasis omitted.)).
The other exception is for a case that is technically moot, but will
nonetheless likely result in negative collateral legal consequences. The Utah
Supre1ne Court discussed that exception in Duran v. Morris. See 635 P.2d 43
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(Utah 1981). The court explained that "it is now clearly established that "a
criininal case is 1noot only if it is shown that there is no possibility that any

Q

collateral legal consequences will be imposed on the basis of the criminal
conviction."' Id.

if45.

"Such collateral consequences may include the use of

the conviction to hnpeach the petitioner's character or as a factor in
determining a sentence in a future trial, as well as the petitioner's inability
to vote." Id. (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968); Carafas v.

La Vallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968)).
But the court also explained that other criminal cases "'entail no
collateral legal consequences of the kind that result from a criminal
conviction." Id. That was h·ue for Duran, who petitioned the district court
for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that prison officials had violated his

constitutional rights by h·ansferring hin1 frmn medium to maximum
security. Id. 45. The district court denied Duran's petition for the writ, and
Duran appealed.

Id.

But at the time Utah Supreme Court addressed
Q

Duran's appeal, Duran had been returned to n1edim11 security. Id.

The

court held that the case was 1noot. The court could give Duran no relief,
and the administrative decisions he chal1enged did not entail legal
consequences of the kind "that result from criminal convictions." Id.

-14-

Utah's law is consistent with federal law.

Federal law has long

recognized the 1nootness doctrine and will dismiss an appeal as moot
"where, by virtue of an 'intervening event' the appellate court cannot' grant
... any effectual relief whatever' in favor of the appellant." Mills v. Green,

159 U.S. at 653-54. Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly dismissed
federal criminal appeals because they were 1noot and the Court could
provide the defendants with no relief. See, e.g., Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1

(1998); Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624 (1982); cf United States v. Juvenile Male,
131 S.Ct. 2860 (2011) Quvenile offender's appeal moot where court could
provide no relief).
But the Supreme Court also recognizes exceptions to the mooh'1ess
doch·ine. In a number of criminal cases, it has held that an appeal was not
moot, even though the defendant had served his sentence, because the
defendant's conviction would likely result in adverse collateral legal
consequences. In Sibron v. New York, the Court acknowledged "the obvious
fact of life that most crin1inal convictions do in fact entail adverse collateral
(-r-.
--.coq1101--.rpc
, •• \._J 1 Iv'-•
-l---dl'-......:..,.J. "

C.:oc' ,..J.//'J.O'") ILJ .,J.
C:

l.ll-.

.-.1-

(ii

i;,::i. ~i::;
v-....r-vv

(cii-1·1",....
.t.L
t5 LCJc"'lJl·C1(
l,Jt
. I

•n

L•.

I fll;t•'·'(-1
C;.,.,fpc ~'10 J____,TC
/., t,.t ....11.,tLt..,,.11 >.....JL./
• ._;.

L,

211 (1946); United Sf-afes v. JV1_orga11 1 346 U.S. 502 (1954); Pollard v. United

States, 352 U.S. 354 (1957)). Under the Court's law, the mere possibility that
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a conviction will result in such consequences preserves a criminal case from
dismissal for mootness." Sibron, 392 U.S. at 55.

Challenges to convictions. Under both Utah and federal law, the
difference between criminal cases that become moot upon the expiration of
a sentence and those that do not is the nature of the defendant's challenge.
Even though a defend ant's sentence has expired, if he challenges his
conviction, the courts presume that the conviction will have adverse

collateral legal consequences- actual consequences that are imposed by
law.

For that reason, the Utah Supreme Court has explained that a

challenge to a conviction constitutes an exception to the mootness rule. See
Duran, 635 P.2d at 45. Accordingly, when a defendant challenges a criminal

conviction, the court will presu1ne that the conviction will carry collateral
legal consequences. Id. The case will therefore be dismissed as moot only if
it is shown that "there is no possibility that any collateral consequences will

be in1posed on the basis of the challenged conviction.'" Duran, 635 P.2d at
45 (citing Sibron, 392 U.S. at 57).

'T'his too is consistent with federal lmv. See Sibron, 392 U.S. at 57 n.17
Q

(althougli sentence had been con1pleted while appeal was pending, adverse
consequences could flow from New York state law permitting use of
conviction to impeach character of a defendant in later criminal
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proceeding); Cara/as, 391 U.S. at 237 (criminal conviction may preclude a
person's engaging in certain businesses, serving as a labor union official,
serving as a juror, or voting); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 632 n.2
(1968) (criminal conviction could result in ineligibility for licensing under
state and municipal license laws); Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 221
(1946) (conviction could subject defendant to adverse legal consequences
affecting deportation).

Challenges to sentences, probation and parole revocation, etc. But
where a defendant challenges something other than his conviction - for
example, his sentence, his probation or parole revocation, or a prison
segregation order-collateral consequences like those attendant to a
criminal conviction are not likely.

In those cases, Utah law holds that

expiration of the sentence renders the case moot unless the defendant can
show some actual adverse legal consequence, some concrete injury-in-fact.
Accordingly, the courts do not presu1ne the existence of such consequences
in a case where the defendant is not challenging his conviction.
AC:
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his petition for a write of habeas corpus, clai1ning that prison officials had
violated his constitutional right by transferring hiln from mediun1. to
maximum security. 635 P.2d at if 45. By the lime the Utah Supreme Court
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addressed the appeal, Duran had been returned to 1nediu1n security. Id.
The court held that the appeal was moot. Id. It could give him no relief,
and the administrative decisions he challenged did not entail legal
consequences like those resulting from criminal convictions. Id.
This Court has addressed exceptions to the mootness doctrine in
nu1nerous cases.

It has distinguished challenges to convictions from

challenges to sentencing, probation and parole revocation, stalking
injunctions, and prison discipline orders.
In a series of cases, this Court has held that an appeal from a sentence
is moot once a defendant has served his sentence, been released from jail,
and had his case closed. See State v. McClellan, 2014 UT App 271, 339 P.3d
942 (addressing challenge to sentences where sentences had been served);

State v. Matthews, 2014 UT App 169, 332 P.3d 406 (addressing challenge to
probation revocation where sentence had been served); Featherson v. Utah

Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 2013 UT App 17,295 P.3d 715 (addressing challenge
to decision denying parole where sentence had been served); Hooker, 2013
UT App 91 (addressing challenge to probation revocation ,;vhere sentence
had been served); St-ate v. Pet-erson, 2012 UT App 363, 293 F.3d 1103
(addressing challenge to sentence where sentence had been served); cf

Towner v. Ridgzvay (Ridgway), 2012 UT App 35, ,r2, 272 P.3d 765 (addressing
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challenge to stalking injunction where injunction had expired); State v.

Moore, 2009 UT App 128, 210 P.3d 967 (addressing challenge to discipline
imposed while defendant was in jail awaiting sentencing where defendant
had been sentenced and transferred to prison).
Each of these cases held that the relief sought was impossible or of no
legal effect because the sentence had been served and the case was there£ore
moot. In Hooker, this Court noted that Hooker had not alleged, much less
demonstrated that either the collateral consequences or public interest
exception applied. 2013 UT App 91, if 3. In McClellan, the court addressed
McClellan's claim of possible legal consequences, but held that the
consequences that he proffered were not hnposed by law and thus did not
qualify as collateral consequences in the mootness context. 2014 UT App
271,
11

if 5. Nor did the appeal fit within the exception for an alleged wrong

capable of repetition yet evading review." Id.

,r 6.

In Peterson, the Court
11

expressly stated that because Peterson did not challenge his conviction, the
collateral consequences attendant to an unlawful conviction [were] not at
issue." 2012 UT App 363,

1l5. In Ridgwny, the Court refused to presun1e that

Ridgway's expired civil stalking injunction in1posed negative collateral legal
consequences on him.

2012 UT App 35, irif7-11.

The Court reiterated,

"Unless a party is challenging a crilninal conviction, we will not presume
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that such collateral consequences exist." Id.

if 7. In Moore, the Court held

that the decision to place Moore in solitary confinement would have no
bearing on his ability to vote, engage in businesses, or serve on a jury; it
could not be used to impeach his character or as a factor in determining a
sentence in a future trial; and it did not require that the parole board deny
parole in a future hearing.

2009 UT App 128, ,rif13, 17. Any collateral

consequences resulting from Moore's prison disciplinary record were
hypothetical, and the Court would not presume them. Id. ,r,r17-19.
The court of appeals has also entered a series of orders dismissing
appeals as moot because the defendants had served their sentences and
consequently no relief was available on appeal.

See State v. Reynolds,

20140706-CA, order dated Dece1nber 18, 2014 (sentence completed); State v.
Craner, 20130526-CA, order dated February 27, 2014 (challenge to h ial
4

court's order terminating probation was moot; defendant had completed his
jail

confine1nent

and

probation

was

tern1inated;

unlike

collateral
Q

consequences of crilninal convictions, "collateral consequences regarding
the effect of terminating probation as unsuccessful are merely hypothetical
Q

rather than aclual adverse consequences that would defeat rnootness"); State

v. Herrera, 20130368-CA, order dated January 23, 2014 (challenge to district
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court's sentencing decision moot where sentence completed and defendant
released from jail; no collateral consequences alleged or demonstrated).
Utah's law is consistent with federal law. Federal law also presumes
that convictions carry collateral legal consequences, but that sentences,
probation and parole revocations, and most other criminal matters do not.
In Lane v. Williams, the Supreme Court held that Williams' challenge to the
court's failure to advise him of a 1nandatory state parole requirement was
moot because Williams had completed parole and been released. 455 U.S.
624, 626-33 (1982). Revocation of Williams' parole and incarceration for his

parole violation subjected him to no legal collateral consequences.

Id. "At

most, certain non-statutory consequences [1night] occur; employment
prospects, or the sentence imposed in a future criminal proceeding could be
affected."

Id. 632.

But, the Supreme Court reasoned, the "discretionary

decisions that are made by an en1ployer or a sentencing judge ... are not
governed by the mere presence or absence of a recorded violation of parole;
these decisions may take into consideration, and are 1nore directly
influenced by, the underlying conduct that formed the basis for the parole
violation.

Any disabilities that flmv frorn whatever respondents did to

evoke revocation of parole are not re1noved- or even affected- by a District
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Court order that simply recites that their parole terms are 'void."' Id. 632G

33.

In Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998), the Supreme Court held that
Randy Spencer's challenge to allegedly unconstitutional parole revocation
procedures was moot because his sentence had expired. The Court declined
"to presume that collateral consequences adequate to meet Article Ill's
injury-in-fact requirement resulted from petitioner's parole revocation." Id.

14.

Citing Sibron, the Court noted that it had, in recent decades, "been

willing to presume that a wrongful criminal conviction has continuing
collateral consequences." Id. 8. But, the Court observed, Spencer did not
"attack his convictions for felony stealing and burglary''; rather, he asserted

Q

"only the wrongful termination of his parole status." Id. 9.
The Court noted that in the context of criminal convictions, "the
presu1nption of significant collateral consequences is likely to c01nport with
reality." Id. 12. But, the Court continued, the "same cannot be said of parole
revocation."

Citing Williams, the Court noted that it had hitherto

Id.

r
t-o exrenG
'
rerusea
1ts presun1pt10n o f· co 11 atera 1 consequences
1

1

•

11

•

ff

to paro 1e

revocation. Id. 12 (citing 455 U.S. at 624). The Court observed that it "was
not enough that the parole violations found by the revocation decision
would enable the parole board to deny (Willia1ns] parole in the future,"
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G

where the violations did not render hhn ineligible for parole, but were
'"simply one factor, a1nong many, that may be considered by the parole
authority."' Id. 13 (quoting Williams, 455 U.S. at 639-40). Moreover, the
parole violations remaining on Williams' record could not affect a
subsequent parole determination unless he again violated the law.

Id.

Finally, these "nonstatutory consequences" were "dependent upon '[t]he
discretionary decisions . . . made by an employer or a sentencing judge ...
not governed by the mere presence or absence of a recorded violation of
parole.'" Id. (quoting Williams, 455 U.S. at 632-33).
Thus, the Spencer court declined "to presume that collateral
consequences adequate to meet Article III' s injury-in-fact requirement
resulted from petitioner's parole revocation." Id. 14. The Court recogn.ized
that Spencer could avoid a d isn1issal by showing a concrete injury-in-fact,
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but it rejected the four injuries that he proffered because they did not
constitute concrete injuries-in-fact. 4 Id. 14-16.
In sum, under both Utah and federal law, the courts presu1ne that a

conviction will result in a negative collateral legal consequences and, unless
the State can show that such consequences are impossible, will hear a
defendant's challenge to a conviction even if he is no longer in custody. But
the courts will not presume that a challenge to a parole revocation or any
other sentence (such as probation) will result in negative collateral legal
consequences.

Thus, when a Defendant challenges his sentence or

probation or parole revocation, the case will be moot if his sentence has
expired unless the Defendant can show a concrete injury-in-fact.

4

The Spencer decision gives guidance about what does not constitute
a concrete injury-in-fact. Spencer argued he had suffered the following
injuries-in-fact: (1) his parole revocation could be used to his deh·iment in a
future parole proceeding, (2) the revocation could be used to increase his
sentence in a future sentencing procedure, (3) the revocation could be used
to iinpeach hiln in a future criininal proceeding, and (4) the revocation
n1ight be used directly against hin1 in a future crim.inal proceeding. Spencer,
523 U.S. at 14-16. The Court rejected them all. The Court held that the
asserted injuries depended on Spencer's again violating the law and on
discretionary decisions by the prosecutor and the presiding judge in any
future criminal proceedings. Id. They were thus merely hypothetical, not
actual consequences or injuries. Id. Iv1oreover, they were not imposed by
law. Id.
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Stated another way, where a defendant challenges his conviction, the
State has the burden to show that no collateral legal consequences are
possible.

But when a defendant challenges something other than his

conviction-for instance, his sentence or his probation revocation-the
defendant has the burden to show that collateral legal consequences
actually exist, i.e., that there is a concrete injury-in-fact.
As explained on pages 18 to 21, supra, this Court has recognized and
applied this precedent in numerous decisions. But the State acknowledges
that in two anomalous 2015 cases the Court did not. In State v. Warner, 2015
UT App 81, 347 P.3d 846, and State v. Allen, 2015 UT App 163, 789 Utah

Adv. Rep. 5, this Court declined to dismiss as moot challenges to probation
revocations, even though the defendants had served their sentences and
been released from jail. In Warner, the Court addressed Warner's challenge
to his probation revocation, even though Warner had con1pleted his
sentences and had been released from jail. 2015 UT App 81, ,1. In Allen,
the Court addressed Allen's· clailn that trial counsel had rendered ineffective
assistance in connection vvith his probation revocation, even though Allen

had also been reieased fron1 custody.

2015 UT App 163, '1j,f1 & 4 n.2.

Neither case involved a challenge to a criminal conviction.
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Rather both

Warner and Allen challenged the revocation of probation. Warner, 2015 UT
App -81, 'ffl; Allen, 2015 UT App 163, ,r1.
The Allen court stated that it was "'not convinced that Allen face[d] no
collateral legal consequences as a result of his felony conviction and
revoked probation terms." 2015 UT App 163,
challenge his conviction.

if 4 n.2 But Allen did not

Rather, he argued that his trial counsel had

rendered ineffective assistance by not asserting that he had mental health
issues as a defense to his probation violation. Id.

,r1.

Because Allen did not

challenge his conviction, any collateral legal consequences of the conviction
were not at issue.
The Warner and Allen decisions are anomalous.

They ignore this

Court's own precedent, Utah Supreme Court precedent, and federal law
consistent with Utah precedent.

They ignore the distinction between

crimin.al convictions on the one hand, and sentencing, probation, and parole
decisions on the other hand.

They ignore the law that presu1nes that

collateral legal consequences attend crin1inal convictions, but refuses to
presume that such consequences attend sentencing, probation, and
revocation decisions.
Warner challenged his probation revocation, not his conviction. 2015

UT App 81, ,r1.

But when the State argued that Warner's enumerated
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consequences

were

"merely

hypothetical

or

possible,"

this

Court

determined that the State's argument was "based on the standard applicable
to civil cases, not criminal cases." Id. if 3.
As authority, the Court cited its own decision in Ridgway, 2012 UT
App 35. The Court recited Ridgway's language that "collateral consequences
may be presumed when 'a party is challenging a criminal conviction,' but
not in civil cases." Id. (quoting Ridgway, 2015 UT App 35, ,I3). Ridgway's
language is correct, but it does not support the Warner decision. Collateral
legal consequences may not be presumed merely because a case addresses
criminal proceedings. Rather, collateral legal consequences are presumed
when an appellant is challenging a criminal conviction. That is because - as
stated- a criminal conviction almost always results in legally-imposed
collateral consequences.
But a defendant's probation revocation, parole decision, or sentence
1nay not be so used. While probation, parole, and sentencing decisions may
be considered by courts, en1ployers, and others in 1naking discretionary
decisions, they do not impose consequences as a n1atter of la·vv. The l1Varner
court therefore is therefore anomalous.
The Allen court also misread relevant precedent when it rejected the
State's 1nooh1ess argument.

In that case, Allen appealed his sentence
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arguing that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not asserting
that Allen had mental health issues as a defense for his probation violation.
2015 UT App 163, ,r1.

While Allen's appeal was pending, Allen was

released from jail. Id. if 4 n.2. The State therefore argued that the appeal was
moot. Id.
The panel rejected that argument, reading Duran to hold that "in a
criminal case a [defendant's] release from custody renders a case moot only

if there is no possibility of collateral consequences." Id. But in so doing, the
panel ignored the Duran language that applies this standard only when a
defendant is challenging a criminal conviction, not when he is challenging
other decisions that may be made during the crhninal process-such as a
decision to revoke probation.
Allen, like Warn.er, was anomalous. Both cases misinterpret governing

case law.

Accordingly, this Court should apply the collateral legal

consequences exception as set forth in Utah Supreme Court case law and in
G

this Court's own extensive pre-2015 case law, not as set forth in Warner and
Allen.

B.

Defendant's appeal is 1noot because now that his sentence
has expired, this Court cannot grant him any relief.

Defendant here is not challenging his crin1inal conviction. Rather, he
is challenging dish·ict court's revocation of his probation. He seeks another
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probation hearing to ask the district court to reconsider its decision to
revoke his probation.

But his sentence has expired, and he has been

released from prison. Thus, Defendant's appeal is moot. As explained, an
issue becomes moot while an appeal is pending if "circumstances change so
that the conh·oversy is eliminated, thereby rendering the relief requested
impossible or of no legal effect." Peterson, 2012 UT App 363, 4. A new
revocation hearing will not allow the district court to reinstate his probation
and give hhn another opportunity to avoid the prison term ordered as a
result of his probation revocation.
Moreover, because Defendant is challenging his probation revocation,
not his conviction, the court will not presu1ne that the probation decision
will have collateral legal consequences. 5 Rather, Defendant has the burden
to show some concrete injury-in-fact-smne consequence imposed by law
that he will actually, not hypothetically, suffer because his probation was

5

Utah's other exception to the mooh1ess doctrine, the exception for
issues of public interest likely to recur and capable of evading review, does
not apply here. Sec Ellis, 2000 UT 101, ,I26. The issue here is not one of
public interest. It does not address a class action, the interpretation of sorrte
constitutional provision, the validity or construction of a statute, or the
propriety of an administrative ruling. See id. ~27. Nor is it an issue likely
to recur and capable of evading review.
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revoked. Nothing suggests that he can do so. For that reason, this Court
should dismiss his appeal as moot.

II.
DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT THE DISTRICT
COURT PLAINLY ERRED BY REVOKING PROBATION

Even if his appeal were not moot, Defendant cannot prevail because
he has not shown that the district court plainly erred by revoking his
probation. Defendant argues that "the trial court violated the mandate rule
when it revoked [his] probation without complying with the Court of
Appeals' mandate on remand." Br.Aplt. 6. Defendant did not preserve this
claim below and has not established plain error on appeal.
A.

Defendant has not shown that the district court violated this
Court's mandate, much less that the court plainly erred for
doing so.

Defendant argues that the district court "violated the n1andate rule in
its determination of this case on remand." Br.Aplt. 6. Because Defendant
did not make this argument below, it is unpreserved.

Thus, Defendant

argues plain error. To establish plain error, he n1ust show obvious, hann.ful
error. Error is obvious only where there is n settled appellate authority" to
support his cJaim.

State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah App. 1997).

Defendant points to no authority suggesting that the district court violated
this Court's mandate when it confinned that it would have revoked
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Defendant's probation on the basis of his single violation for not
cooperating and complying with AP&P.
"The mandate rule dictates that the pronouncements of an appellate
court on legal issues in a case become the law of that case. The mandate
rule . .- . binds both the district court and the parties to honor the mandate of
the appellate court." Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Bagley & Co.,
2011 UT App 252, ,JS, 262 P.3d 1188 (citing Utah Dep't ofTransp. v. Ivers, 2009
UT 56, ,r12, 218 P.3d 583 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Whether a
district court complies with an appellate court's mandate is a question of
law. McLaughlin v. Schenk, 2013 UT App 20, if19, 299 P.3d 1139.
But before reviewing the district court's compliance, the reviewing
court must ask a preliminary question.

As the Utah Supreme Court

explained, that" crucial question" is what the appellate court meant when it
remanded the case. State v. Lopes, 2001 UT 85, ,118, 980 P.2d 191.
In remanding this case, this Court ordered the district court to
"reassess whether, under all the circumstances," Defendant's "probation
should be revoked." Legg I, 20-14 UT App 80, if25. Defendant asserts that
this Court meant that it "had no confidence that a decisjon to revoke

probation based on [Defendant's] relatively 1ninor failure to contact his
probation officer on five of the seven days he was on probation, would be
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justified."

Br.Aplt. 8.

Defendant further asserts that the district court

violated this Court's 1nandate when "(d]espite the Court of Appeals' clear
expression of concern that the single violation was not enough to revoke
[Defendant's] probation," it "nonetheless decided '[t]here is no question
that if there had been any finding of violation of probation that it would
have been revoked."' Id. 9 (referencing R377:21).
But this Court did not suggest that it lacked confidence that revoking
on the basis of the single violation was justifiable. To the contrary, this
Court expressly recognized that" a single violation is sufficient to support a
probation revocation." Legg I, 2014 UT App 80, if 11.
The Court was not concerned with what the disb·ict court could do,
but with what it would have done. The Court merely expressed that it was
"not confident that, standing on its own, the single violation would have
resulted in a revocation of probation," i.e., that the disb·ict court would have
revoked probation had it found only the single violation. Legg I, 2014 UT
App 80, 'lf25

It therefore asked the district court to "reassess whether,

under all the circumstances,. [Defendant's] probation should be revoked."

Id.
In other words, the mandate told the district court to reassess the
willfulness of the drug-possession and failure-to-establish-a-residence
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violations.

It should then detennine- on the basis of whatever willful

violations had been established-whether Defendant's probation should be
revoked. But when the State withdrew the drug-possession and failure-toestablish-a-residence allegations, it was no longer necessary to reconsider
the willfulness of those violations. Only one question remained: would the
dish·ict court have revoked Defendant's probation had there been only one
willful violation before it-the violation for failing to cooperate and be
compliant with AP&P.

The district court fulfilled this Court's mandate

when it determined that there was "no question" but that it would have
revoked probation on the basis of that single violation. R377:23. Indeed the
district court expressly stated that it had "no question that that would have
been [its] ruling."

R377:24.

Moreover, the court made clear that even

reassessing its decision on re1nand, it would find that the "circumstances

still support it." Id.
B.

Defendant has not shown that the district court plainly erred
when it exercised its discretion to revoke his probation on the
basis of his single violation.
Defendant finally asserts that the district court plainly erred in

revoking his probation "on an insufficient basis."

Br.Aplt. 11.

But

Defendant's willfully failing to cooperate and cmnply with his probation
officer was a sufficient basis.
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A district court acts "within its considerable discretion" in making
probation decisions, including its decisions on what sanctions to impose for
any violations. Vazquez, 2014 UT App 159, if7. These include decisions on
whether to impose an original prison sentence, to reinstate probation, or to
modify probation.

See id. "A court abuses its discretion only when 'no

reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court."' Id.
(quoting State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Utah App. 1991)). A "single
violation of probation is legally sufficient to support a probation
revocation." Legg I, 2014 UT App 80, ifll (citing Jameson, 800 P.2d at 804).
Here, the record demonstrates that the district court acted within its
discretion when it revoked probation. Defendant had a history of violent
crilnes, including "n1ultiple assaults, theft fr01n a person, aggravated
assaults, arson, violation of a protective order, and burglary." 6 R1007 at 267.
Defendant committed the offenses for which he was on probation within six
months following his release fr01n prison. R1007 at 267. The offenses were
11

both against his girlfriend. R1007 at 268. He also had a history of arrn.ing
himself ,vith vveapons."

R1007 at 267.

6

Moreover, the distTict court had

The quoted n1aterial is frorn the April 24, 2012 amended probation
violation report. The report is filed at R1007 at 265-69 and R0067 at 292-96.
The reports are attached to the back side of the front cover of the pleadings
file in their respective cases.
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determined when it first revoked Defendant's probation that Defendant was
likely ineligible for residential rehabilitation and that the jail did not offer
programs that would help him. R301:127-29.
Defendant also had a long and unsuccessful history with AP&P. That
history began in 1987. Id. But Defendant had "never been successful at
com1nunity supervision, either on parole or probation." Id. Indeed, AP&P
recommended that Defendant's "probation be revoked and the original
sentence[s] imposed." R1007 at 269.
Under these circumstances, the decision to revoke probation and
reinstate Defendant's suspended sentences was well within the trial court's
discretion.

A reasonable person faced with Defendant's criminal and

probation history could readily decide to revoke based on Defendant's
single violation for not cooperating with AP&P. Accordingly, the district
court did not abuse its discretion, much less plainly err, when- based on
Defendant's willful violation for not cooperating with AP&P-it revoked
his probation and executed his suspended sentences.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing
reasons, the Court should affirn1.
u
(.._,
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•;j=Revocation of probation or supervised release

324 P.3d 656
Court of Appeals of Utah.

A trial court's decision to revoke probation is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
John L. LEGG Jr., Defendant and Appellant.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

No. 20120473-CA. I April 10, 2014.
121

·..;;

Synopsis
Background: State petitioned to revoke defendant's
probation and impose original sentence on conviction for
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The Third
District Court, Salt Lake Department, Ryan M. Harris, J .,
granted petition and impose original sentence. Defendant
appealed.

Criminal Law
~-;;•Necessity of Objections in General

Plain error is established only if: (i) an error
exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to
the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful,
meaning, absent the error, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the
appellant, or phrased differently, confidence in
the verdict is undermined.

Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that:

1 Cases that cite this headnote

lll remand was necessary for trial court to indicate the

evidence relied on or the reasons for finding that
defendant willfully possessed a controlled substance with
knowledge of its narcotic character;
[3)
2

l l trial court made the necessary indication on the record

as to the evidence relied on or the reasons for finding that
defendant had willfully failed to be cooperative,
compliant, and truthful with his probation officer;

Criminal Law
i=Counsel for accused

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
when raised on appeal for the first time, presents
a question of law. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.

3

l l remand was necessary for trial court to indicate the

evidence relied on or the reasons for finding that
defendant willfully violated the terms and conditions of
his probation by failing to establish a place of residence or
report his whereabouts on a daily basis; and

Cases that cite this headnote

4

l l counsel's failure to object to trial court's finding that

defendant violated his probation by failing to be
cooperative, compliant, and truthful with his probation
officer was not ineffective assistance.

[4)

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Criminal Law

To revoke probation, the trial court must find a
violation of the probation agreement by a
preponderance of the evidence.
2 Cases that cite this headnote

West Headnotes ( 17)
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Sentencing and Punishment
.:,>~Violation of probation condition
Sentencing and Punishment
•~=-Degree of proof
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(5)

probation
revocation
Const.Amend. 14.

Sentencing and Punishment
._:;;:-,Violation of probation condition
Sentencing and Punishment
i~•Degree of proof

To revoke probation, the trial court must find,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
violation was willful, and not merely the result
of circumstances beyond the probationer's
control.

U.S.C.A.

Cases that cite this headnote

19)

Constitutional Law
~--Notice and hearing; proceedings

The minimum due process protections
applicable to probation revocation proceedings
include a written statement by the fact finders as
to the evidence relied on and reasons for
revoking probation. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

(6)

hearing.

Sentencing and Punishment
~, Violation of probation condition

Cases that cite this headnote

A single violation of probation is legally
sufficient to support a probation revocation.
(10)

1 Cases that cite this headnote

171

When a probation revocation hearing is
recorded, a written finding as to the evidence
relied on and reasons for revoking probation is
constitutionally required only if the transcript
and record before the judge do not enable a
reviewing comt to detennine the basis of the
judge's decision to revoke probation.

Controlled Substances
i:.:~•Elements in general
Controlled Substances
i=Knowledge and intent

To prove possession of a controlled substance,
the State must establish that the accused
exercised dominion and control over the drug
with knowledge of its presence and narcotic
character. West's U.C.A. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i).

Cases that cite this headnote

fill

Cases that cite this headnote

18)

Criminal Law
.,Probation

1~" 0

Before appellate court can properly address the
issue of insufficient evidence in the context of
an alleged violation of probation, it must first
determine if the trial court revealed its reasoning
and the evidence upon which it relied in a way
that satisfies the due process requirements of a

Sentencing and Punishment
~-=Necessity and purpose

1

Criminal Law
,:-=Sentence
Sentencing and Punishment
,>·-Necessity and purpose

If the evidence relied on and the reasons for
revoking probation are not revealed, then a
remand for a rehearing is appropriate.
Cases that cite this headnote
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Criminal Law
":.=Sentence
Sentencing and Punishment
.C=Sufficiency

115)

Remand was necessary for trial court to indicate
the evidence relied on or the reasons for finding
that defendant willfully possessed a controlled
substance with knowledge of its narcotic
character, as was necessary to support
revocation of defendant's probation; trial court
originally found only that defendant had control
of the substance, "whatever it was,'' and that,
more likely than not, he was aware of its
presence, and after defendant's trial counsel
objected, trial court promptly revised its findings
to meet the applicable legal requirement, but it
failed to give any indication of its basis for
doing so. West's U.C.A. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i).

Remand was necessary for trial court to indicate
the evidence relied on or the reasons for finding
that defendant willfully violated the terms and
conditions of his probation by failing to
establish a place of residence or report his
whereabouts on a daily basis; trial court did not
explain whether it found the violation to be the
result of defendant's failure to establish a
residence of record or whether it found the
violation to be the result of defendant's failure
to call in with updated "residence" information
every night, and a showing that defendant had
the means to comply with the residence
requirement was necessary to establish a willful
violation.

I Cases that cite this headnote

[13)

Cases that cite this headnote

Sentencing and Punishment
:.:=Sufficiency

Trial court made the necessary indication on the
record as to the evidence relied on or the reasons
for finding that defendant had willfully failed to
be cooperative, compliant, and truthful with his
probation officer, as was necessary to support
revocation of defendant's probation based on
violation of that term or condition of probation;
evidence and statements contained in the record
made the evidentiary basis for this finding
sufficiently clear.

Criminal Law
~Sentence
Sentencing and Punishment
~Sufficiency

(16)

Criminal Law
~Other particular issues

Trial counsel's failure to object to trial court's
finding that defendant violated his probation by
failing to be cooperative, compliant, and truthful
with his probation officer by nol calling his
probation officer on most days was not
ineffective assistance of counsel; the record and
transcript supported trial court's finding on this
point, meaning an objection would have been
unavailing. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

Cases that cite this headnote
114)

Sentencing and Punishment
1:=Defenses and objections

If a defendant's failure to comply with terms
and conditions of probation resulted from
problems beyond his control, his probation
cannot be revoked.

(17)

Criminal Law
~~Particular Cases and Issues

Failure to raise futile objections does not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
Cases that cite this headnote
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U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.
Cases that cite this headnote
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Opinion

ORME, Judge:
~

1 John L. Legg Jr. appeals the trial court's decision to
revoke his probation and impose the original sentence on
his convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon, a third degree felony, Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-103 (LexisNexis 2012), and for possession of a
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third degree
felony, id § 76-10-503. Because of concerns we have
with the revocation decision, we remand for further
consideration by the trial court.

BACKGROUND

,r 2 In reviewing a revocation

of probation, we recite the
facts in the "light most favorable to the trial court's
findings." State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah
1990). Here, the trial court's findings were made orally
from the bench and were relatively sparse. Thus, our
recitation of the facts also includes findings implicitly
made by the trial court and matters that are undisputed in
the record.

1

3 The day he completed the jail term that was a
component of his probation, Legg met with his probation
officer to go over his probation agreement. Legg was
particularly concerned about the requirement in the
agreement that he establish a residence of record. He told

the probation officer he was homeless and had no savings.
The probation officer instructed Legg to check in by
telephone every day until he established a residence. Legg
claimed that he did not remember any such instruction,
but it is undisputed that Legg failed to call on most days.
After about a week, however, Legg showed up for a
scheduled in-person interview with his probation officer
and was arrested for suspected probation violations.

1

4 During a search incident to the arrest, Legg's
probation officer discovered a very small amount of
cocaine-less than one-tenth of a normal dose-in the
bottom of a pill bottle where Legg was storing his
prescription medicine. A family member gave the piil
bottle to Legg so he would have a more convenient
method for storing his pills than in the bulky containers
provided to him by jail personnel upon his release. He
claimed to have never noticed the thirty-four to thirty-six
milligrams of white substance in the bottle even though,
on a regular basis, he "dumped" the pills out to take them
as prescribed and returned the remaining contents to the
bottle. A drug test administered at the same time showed
that Legg had not been using cocaine. Nevertheless, the
State initiated a separate criminal proceeding against
Legg for possession of a controlled substance. In the
ensuing trial, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty.

1 5 During the subsequent evidentiary hearing to consider
revoking Legg's probation, which is the subject of this
appeal, the trial court heard testimony from the probation
officer and from Legg and considered the physical
evidence of the cocaine. The trial court found, with our
emphasis, that it was "more likely than not that [Legg]
would know that there was a substance in there, whatever
it was." Legg's attorney pointed *659 out that, in order to
find a violation, the court had to be convinced that Legg
had knowledge of the narcotic character of the substance,
not just that he had control over it and had knowledge of
its presence, "whatever it was." Without identifying any
additional evidence, the trial court then immediately
revised its finding: "I think at least by a preponderance
I'm going to find that Mr. Legg knew that that was a
controlled substance in the bottle[.]"

,r 6 At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found
that Legg had violated the terms of his probation in three
ways: (I) he knowingly possessed a controlled substance;
(2) he failed to be cooperative, compliant, and truthful
with his probation officer; and (3) he failed to establish a
residence of record. In doing so, however, the trial com1
expressed concerns about revoking probation so quickly
and opined that Legg's probation officer "had an awful
quick trigger on Mr. Legg in this case."

--=------------------------------------------------~---,·:~-:-tlM'/1Next © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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obvious in this case that the trial court would have
exercised its discretion the same way if any one of the
three violations was not properly established.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
111 , 7 Legg argues that the trial court did not properly

focus on the requirement that probation violations must be
willful and that the evidence was insufficient to support a
finding that any violation of the probation agreement was
willful. We review a trial court's decision to revoke
probation for an abuse of discretion. State v. Jameson,
800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990).
121 ~ 8 Legg did not preserve this issue for appeal but

argues that the trial court was plainly in error in not
focusing on the requirement of willfulness. Plain error is
established only if: "(i) An error exists; (ii) the error
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the
error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant,
or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is
undermined." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09
(Utah 1993 ).
131

1 9 Legg also asserts that he had ineffective assistance
of counsel. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
when raised on appeal for the first time, presents a
question of law. See State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ,r 6, 89
P.3d 162.

ANALYSIS

J,

141 l5

10 To revoke probation, the trial court must find a
violation of the probation agreement by a preponderance
of the evidence. State v. Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 991
(Utah Ct.App.1994). In addition, the trial court must find,
also by a preponderance of the evidence, that the violation
was willful, see State v. Maestas, 2000 UT App 22, 1 24,
997 P.2d 314, and not merely the result of circumstances
beyond the probationer's control, see State v. Hodges, 798
P .2d 270, 277 (Utah Ct.App.1990).
161

,r 11 We recognize that a single violation of probation
is legally sufficient to support a probation revocation. See
Jameson, 800 P.2d at 804 ("The decision to grant,
modify, or revoke probation is in the discretion of the trial
court."). But considering the expressed qualms of the trial
court about the revocation decision, it is appropriate to
address each finding individually. And because it appears
to have been the totality of the three violations found by
the trial court that prompted the trial court's decision to
revoke notwithstanding its misgivings, it is less than

I. Possession of a Controlled Substance
171

1 12 Legg argues that there was insufficient evidence to
show that he knowingly possessed a controlled substance.
To prove possession of a controlled substance in violation
of Utah Code section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), the State must
establish "that tl-ie accused exercised dominion and
control over the drug with knowledge of its presence and
narcotic character." State v. Winters, 16 Utah 2d 139,. 396
P.2d 872, 874 (1964). Accord State v. Salas, 820 P.2d
1386, 1388 (Utah Ct.App.1991).
,I 13 The record is more than sufficient to show, at least
by a preponderance of the evidence, that Legg exercised
dominion and control over the substance in his pill bottle
*660 that later proved to be cocaine and that he had
knowledge of its physical presence. He had exclusive
control over the pill bottle for about a week, and the trial
court did not exceed its discretion in inferring that by
"dumping" out the pills on a regular basis it was more
likely than not that Legg had knowledge of its presence. It
is less clear; however, that Legg had knowledge of the
substance's narcotic character. This is an essential
element of the violation. If Legg had no idea what the
substance at the bottom of his pill bottle was, then it
cannot be said that he willfully violated his probation
agreement by possessing a controlled substance. Counsel
below was correct in raising a timely concern with the
court that it was not enough to find that Legg knew the
substance, "whatever it was," was in the pill bottle.
Instead, the trial court needed to find that Legg also knew
of the narcotic character of the substance in order to
conclude that Legg violated the terms of his probation.
181 ~ 14 The trial court acknowledged this and amended its

finding to include that Legg had the requisite knowledge,
but it did so without any reference to evidence on which it
may have relied or the rationale for its immediately
revised reasoning. Legg's argument about the
insufficiency of the evidence in this regard is well taken.
Most telli..ngly, at one point in the hearing, Legg's counsel
complained that there was no basis for assuming that
Legg would be able to identify cocaine residue because
"there has never been any evidence that he has a history
with cocaine." In response, the State conceded, "We
didn't bring that out in any of this." However, before we
can properly address the issue of insufficient evidence, we
must first determine if the trial court revealed its

------------------------·•------~-----
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reasoning and the evidence upon which it relied in a way
that satisfies the due process requirements of a probation
revocation hearing. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
778, 786, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973).
9
1 1 11°1 111 1 ~ 15 In Gagnon, the United States Supreme

Court held that the minimum due process protections
applicable to probation revocation proceedings include "
'a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence
relied on and reasons for revoking [probation].' " Id
(quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,489, 92 S.Ct.
2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), and extending Morrissey's
parole revocation rule to probation hearings). The Court
has explained that the "written statement required by
Gagnon ... helps to insure accurate factfinding with
respect to any alleged violation and provides an adequate
basis for review to determine if the decision rests on
permissible grounds supported by the evidence." Black v.
Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 613-14, 105 S.Ct. 2254, 85
L.Ed.2d 636 (1985). But when a probation revocation
hearing is recorded, a written finding is "constitutionally
required only if the transcript and record before the judge
do not enable a reviewing court to determine the basis of
the judge's decision to revoke probation." Morishita v.
Morris, 702 F.2d 207, 210 (10th Cir.1983). If the
"evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking"
probation are not revealed, then a remand for a rehearing
is appropriate. State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah
Ct.App.1990).

,r

16 In Hodges, the record contained some evidence
supporting
probation
revocation,
but
other
evidence-letters from a social worker and a corrections
supervisor-was absent from the record on appeal. Id at
273. In its finding, the trial court in Hodges did not make
it clear how much it had relied on the missing letters and
how much it had relied on the other evidence. Id at 274.
We remanded because "[t]he record on review [did] not
adequately reveal the evidence relied on by the court." Id
at 275.

1 17 As in Hodges, the record and transcript available
in this case do not readily reveal the evidence relied on or
the reasons for finding that Legg willfully possessed a
controlled substance with knowledge of its narcotic
character. The trial court originally found only that Legg
had control of the subs lance, "whalewr il was," and that,
more likely than not, he was aware of its presence. After
Legg's counsel objected, the trial court promptly revised
its findings to meet the applicable legal requirement, but it
failed to give any indication of its basis for doing so.
121
£

*661 ,r 18 The State directs us to a confidential
competency evaluation ordered by a trial court in a

previous matter as evidence of Legg's familiarity with
cocaine. During the court-ordered competency evaluation,
Legg made potentially incriminating statements to a
social worker. The trial court did not reveal if it relied on
this evidence or not, although it apparently was among the
voluminous materials before the court.

,r

19 Because we cannot determine from the record what
evidence, if any, the trial court relied on in finding that
Legg had knowledge of the narcotic character of the
substance in his pill bottle, we cannot conclude that Legg
willfully violated his probation. We therefore remand to
the trial court to identify the evidence it relied on and its
reason for moving so quickly from a finding of "whatever
it was" to a finding of knowledge that the substance was
cocaine. See Black, 471 U.S. at 613-14, 105 S.Ct. 2254
(holding that without a finding from the trial court
detailing the evidence relied on and the reasons for
probation revocation, there will not be "an adequate basis
for review to determine if the decision rests on
permissible grounds supported by the evidence").

II. Failure To Be Cooperative, Compliant, and
Truthful

,r 20 Legg argues that the evidence is insufficient to show
that he willfully failed to be cooperative, compliant, and
truthful with his probation officer. The probation officer
testified that he instructed Legg to check in by telephone
every day until he established a residence. Legg failed to
do so. The State produced evidence that Legg could have
called every day if he had wanted to do so. While it may
have been inconvenient at times, Legg admitted that he
did have access to telephones. It is also clear that Legg
had the correct telephone number for his probation officer
because he called and left two messages on the second
day of his probation. The trial court found the probation
officer's testimony to be more reliable and ruled that
Legg's failure to call was a willful violation of his
probation agreement.
~ 21 Again, the trial court did not explicitly reveal the
evidence relied on or its reasoning in reaching this
conclusion, see supra 1 19, but on this issue the evidence
and statements contained in the record make the
evidentiary basis for this finding sufficiently clear. See
Morishita v. Morris, 621 P .2d 691, 693 n. 2 (Utah 1980)
("[T]he transcript, in which many statements by the judge
appear, reveals the judge's thought process and the
conclusions he drew from the evidence. An entry of
formal findings of fact and conclusions of law would add
nothing[.]"). Concerning the first prong of the plain error
1131
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test, we do not conclude that the trial court made any
error, plain or otherwise, in connection with this ruling.
See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993).
The evidence was sufficient to reasonably conclude that
Legg knew he was supposed to call, that he had the means
to call, and that his failure to consistently do so was
willful. See State v. Brady, 2013 UT App 102, ~ 7, 300
P.3d 778 (concluding that findings of willfulness in the
probation revocation context can be implicit).

U.S. 606, 613-14, 105 S.Ct. 2254, 85 L.Ed.2d 636
(1985). Accordingly, we remand to the trial court to
identify the facts on which it relied in concluding that
Legg willfully failed to establish a residence of record.

IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
6
fl 1 1171

III. Failure To Establish a Residence
1141 1 22 Legg argues that the court plainly erred because

the evidence was insufficient to show that he willfully
failed to establish a residence of record. Legg argues that
the trial cowt based its finding solely on the undisputed
fact that Legg remained homeless after one week of
probation. If this was, in fact, the trial court's reasoning,
then it may have plainly erred. If an "appellant's failure ...
resulted from problems beyond his contro1, his probation
cannot be revoked." State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 277
(Utah Ct.App.1990). On appeal, however, the State argues
that the requirement to call every day was an
accommodation to Legg that effectively replaced the
requirement that he establish a residence of record. This
allowed Legg to remain transient so long as he reported
his temporary "residence of record" every night.

1 24 Legg argues that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to
object to the trial court's revocation of probation without
sufficient evidence of the willfulness of Legg' s violations.
We conclude that trial counsel's failure to object to the
finding that Legg violated his probation by failing to be
cooperative, compliant, and truthful with his probation
officer-Le., by not calling his probation officer on most
days-was not ineffective. As previously discussed, see
supra 1 21, the record and transcript support the trial
court's finding on this point, meaning an objection would
have been unavailing. "Failure to raise futile objections
does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.,,
State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, 126, 1 P.3d 546. As a result,
we conclude that trial counsel was not ineffective in this
regard. And because we have already remanded for
reconsideration on the remaining issues, it is unnecessary
to address the effectiveness of counsel with respect to
those issues.

1151 1 23 The trial court, however, did not explain whether

it found the violation to be the result of Legg's failure to
establish a residence of record or whether it found the
violation to be the result of Legg's failure to call in with
updated "residence" infonnation every night. It certainly
appears that it was *662 the former, although the trial
court cut short any opportunity to flesh out the basis for
this claimed violation. The judge stated:
I think I can find based on the
evidence that has been presented
today that Mr. Legg did fail to
establish a residence of record and
that ... he did fail to be cooperative,
compliant and truthful with certain
dealings .... So I'm going to make a
finding without even hearing from
you folks on argument ... that those
two have been violated.

CONCLUSION

125 We affirm the finding that Legg willfully violated his
probation agreement by failing to be cooperative,
compliant, and truthful with his probation officer. But we
are not confident that, standing on its own, the single
violation that we affirm would have resulted in a
revocation of probation. We remand on the issues of
possession of a controlled substance and failure to
establish a residence of record for further consideration
and explanation by the trial court. On remand, the trial
court must reassess whether, under all the circumstances,
Legg's probation should be revoked.

All Citations
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This finding leaves us without "adequate basis for review
to detennine if the decision rests on permissible grounds
supported by the evidence." See Black v. Romano, 4 71
'/,·~:~.tt2.•:iNext © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

7

@

State v. Legg, 324 P.3d 656 (2014)
758 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 2014 UT App 80
End of Document

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

@

@

@

V✓estlcwvNexr

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

8
@

Addendum B

•

Addendum B

Utah Department of Corrections
Division of Institutional Operations
ROLLIN COOK
Executive Director

State of Utah

LONDON STROMBERG

GARY R. HERBERT

Deputy Executive Director

Governor

SPENCER J. COX

JERRY POPE
Director, Division of lnstit111io11a/ Opera/ions

lieutenant Governor

·<JP

July 15, 2015

Re: John Lyle Jr Legg DOB: December 13, 1968 OFF# 43079

To Whom It May Concern:

This letter is to confirm that the above named individual was incarcerated under the
jurisdiction of the Utah Department of Corrections. This inmate was most recently received on
May 4, 2012. This inmate was Discharged on July 15, 2015

Sin~yr~.1ly.
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De1~isc Rucker, Office Specialist
Utah State Prison
010 Records Department
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